On this scheme of things, a king is but a man; a queen is but a woman; a woman is but an animal; and an animal not of the highest order (Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France). Explain and assess Burke’s critique of revolution.

Introduction

Before 1789, Edmund Burke was characterised for his involvement in supporting liberal movements (Gottschalk, 1956, p.417). Not least including showing support for American colonists in their cause for independence and the prosecution of Warren Hastings, who Burke believed had committed injustice in colonial India. As a result, it came to the surprise of contemporaries when Burke showed no sympathy to the revolution in France (Hampsher-Monk, 2012, p.1). In response to the unfolding events, Burke wrote Reflections on the Revolution in France, initially as a letter but was later developed further. At the core of his writing, Burke is concerned with society’s stability and so part of his intention in publishing Reflections was to discourage those in Britain from admiring and imitating the revolution in France (Mosher, 1991, p.402). Central to Burke’s idea of stability is the suggestion that we ought to pay a greater appreciation to ideas which have stood the test of time. This is because, for Burke, longevity is an indication of robustness and hence stability. This fundamental belief gives Burke a compelling argument against the French revolution as they fail to appreciate the value of long-held customs and traditions. Consequently, to fill the vacuum in disregarding societal institutions, Burke believes the revolutionaries are mistaken to assume their deductive reasoning in constituent power would be superior to the accumulation of wisdom through history. Finally, Burke illustrates how stable reform can occur without taking the form of a revolution.

Tradition and Institutions

Burke is arguably justified in his critiques of revolution by suggesting revolutionaries in France fail to appreciate the importance of time-tested traditions and institutions in maintaining stability within society. Browning (1984) suggests that like the Roman statesman Cicero, Burke ‘shared an abiding suspicion of those terribles simplificateurs whose utopian political visions filtered out all clutter’ (p.63). Indeed, in Reflections Burke contends as ‘On this scheme of things, a king is but a man; a queen is but a woman; a woman is but an animal; and an animal not of the highest order’ (1790 [1989], p.128). The implication being, if one filters out the ‘clutter’, such as carelessly choosing not to acknowledge hierarchical roles, there is nothing to prevent one from diminishing man further by choosing not to distinguish between men and animals. Of course, this kind of reductio ad absurdum which Burke is making is a broader criticism of reductive thinking on the part of revolutionaries in France and thus their lack of appreciation for long-held institutions. This disregard for customs is apparent in the Sieyes’ work. For instance, in What is the Third Estate? (1789), Sieyes argued that the “the so-called usefulness of a privileged order to the public service is a fallacy” (1789 [2014], p.45). The rationale behind this argument is underpinned by the notion that the Third Estate is ‘everything’ (1789 [2014], p.45). To a large extent Sieyes makes a well-founded point; the Third Estate made up almost every class of life outside the elite, from peasant farmers to the professional and mercantile class. Crucially, this group included much of the ancien régime’s creditors. Creditors which had lent the monarchy to fight in costly global wars like the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) and aiding in the support of the American War of Independence (1775–1783). It became abundantly clear to many when the Estates General was summoned in 1789 that not only did the monarchy depend on the Third Estate for credit, but that this credit was going to be paid back with increased taxes on the very people who lent it. As such it became explicit to Sieyes that change was necessary as he notes ‘what an odd country, where the citizens who profit most from the commonwealth contribute least to it’ (1789 [2014], p.77). Naturally, since Sieyes believed that since other estates were not necessary for the functioning of the nation, their status in the social hierarchy ought to be removed. Ultimately, it appears that Sieyes offers reasonable logic for the basis of revolutionary change.

However, while Sieyes offers reasons for why the clergy and nobility are not worth their compensation in status, Burke suggests revolutionaries should still be careful of the consequences of reductionary thought. In Reflections he argues ‘it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society’ (1790 [1989], p.112) This develops a further point which is that customs and traditions of long-held institutions cannot be quantitatively measured. As a result any attempt to compare the impact of the respective groups in this way is a misguided approach. For instance, he notes that ‘when antient opinions and rules of life are taken away, the loss cannot possibly be estimated. From that moment we have no compass to govern us; nor can we know distinctly to what port we stee’ (1790 [1989], p.129). Crucially, the idea that ‘the loss cannot possibly be estimated’ applies to the role of clergy and nobility; their value, unlike the amount of debt the third-estate can take on or its capacity to lend, is not easily measurable. But regardless of its measurability, Burke still provides examples of value the other estates provide as ‘the nobility and the clergy, the one by profession, the other by patronage, kept learning in existence  even in the midst of arms and confusions, and whilst governments were rather in their causes than formed’  (1789 [2014], p.130). Hence, while Sieyes initially offers a sensible rationale to disregard traditions on the basis that these customs have created roles that are unnecessary, Burke’s cautionary advice remains strong especially given the potential permanent consequences that the revolutionaries may inflict.

Abstract Ideals

While Burke argues that the French revolutionaries underestimate the value of time-tested traditions he also contends that the abstract foundations of the revolution and attempt at universalist blueprints for society come from careless reasoning. Sieyes declared that ‘The Third Estate contains everything that pertains to the nation; and everything that is not the Third Estate cannot be regarded as being of the nation’ (1789 [2014], p.45). In adopting a kind of Hobbesian logic he rationalises that constituent power lies in the nation only i.e the Third Estate, alongside this is the notion that the previous constitution has to be replaced to ensure change. To Burke, this was the critical difference to other so-called revolutions. While the American War of Independence (1775–1783) was about preserving colonial liberty and the Glorious Revolution (1688) ‘was made to preserve our ancient, indisputable laws and liberties’ the French Revolution was about new beginnings. Indeed, Hampsher-Monk (2012) suggests that ‘Burke's opposition is thus not to reason, but to the arrogance of individual, a priori, deductive reason.’ (p.197) The kind of deductive reason Hampsher-Monk (2012, p.197) refers to is the revolutionaries' attempt at constructing a constitution from ab initio and from first principles. Indeed, The Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen (1789) makes this point clear by asserting that ‘The representatives of the French people… have determined to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, unalienable, and sacred rights of man’ (p.1). The reason Burke held such disdain for this kind of revolution in France was for two. Firstly, Burke sees ‘the nature of man [to be] intricate; the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity’ and thus an attempt to construct a constitution from ab initio is a mistake in the reductive sense. Secondly, as Insole (2012) suggests, ‘[like] Cicero, Burke attaches himself to a conception of natural law as constituted by the teleological structure of a divinely framed universe, in conformity to which human beings need to orient themselves’ (p.3) Certainly, to Burke, the present is an accumulation of historical wisdom in which people has come to form prejudices in people about the world, i.e ‘untaught feelings’ (1790, [1989], p.139) which guide in society. Thus for Burke, to restart from abstract principles is an ignorant misunderstanding of the fabric of tradition. This leads Hampsher-Monk (2012) to suggest Burke believed ‘those invoking natural rights were thus to be understood as seeking… to abandon the conventions… that had removed us from the state of violence and confusion’ (p.198). Hampsher-Monk (2012, p.198)  further notes that this ‘invokes a technically Hobbesian conception of natural right as pre-social.’ Indeed, Burke predicts France falling into a kind of state of nature, which arguably took the form of the Reign of Terror (1793-1794). However, it is also well known that Burke was ill-informed of the state of affairs in France so his correct forecasting should not be looked on as proof for his argument (Palmer, 1984, p.181). On balance, in spite of the seemingly rational logic the revolution was based on, Burke again offers strong cautionary criticism particularly highlighting the arrogance in which it takes to presume current rationality could outperform the accumulation of wisdom from previous generations.

Gradual Reform

Ultimately, while Burke highlights the potential instability which can be caused by the reductive thinking within the revolution, he also makes clear possible avenues for change. Writing as a response to Burke in Rights of Man (1791), Thomas Paine suggests ‘Every age and generation must be as free to act for itself in all cases as the age and generations which preceded it’ (para.26). Part of Paine’s criticism here is that generations should be able to have the freedom to change in the way they see fit, unchained from those who came before them. But Burke is not inherently against change, he acknowledges that reform is necessary to maintain stability as ‘a state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation’ (1790, [1989], p.72). The critical point being made in Reflections is that change without any consideration to accumulated wisdom is, to Burke, hubristic and will heighten the likelihood of societal breakdown. Meanwhile, Wollstonecraft makes a different criticism by suggesting that Burke’s ideas are based on ‘gothic notions of beauty’ (para. 24). Gillian (2011) notes that Wollstonecraft interprets Burke’s idealisation of history as a ‘mistaken respect for what was crumbling into decay, like an old castle’ (p.8). However, arguably Burke’s acclaim towards long-held traditions is derived from pragmatism rather than sentiment. For instance, he argues that ‘the science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori’ (1790, [1989], p.72). Burke here is suggesting that stable change should ‘not to be taught a priori’ but rather like science in which trial and error succeeds. Hence, Burke suggests with respect to stability, change must come gradually and incrementally, while appreciating that the longevity of customs and ideas indicate robustness.

Conclusion

Overall, Burke’s ideas are best employed as cautionary warnings. While the ideas the French Revolution was built upon were seemingly rational, such as the removal of hereditary privilege, Burke foreshadows potential instability. More glaringly, Burke highlights the individual arrogance to assume deductive reasoning from contemporaries would yield superior results than the accumulation of knowledge found in long-held institutions and traditions, regarding the creation of a constitution. Instead, for change to come in hand with stability, reform must come gradually and with consideration of past generations. Therefore, Burke’s ideas offer a compelling case against revolution in the form of valid criticism against reductionary thinking.

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